In a few days 9/11 turns 19. Old enough to fight in Afghanistan were it a person. Old enough to fight in a war began before its birth.
In recent years, all the traditional bipartisan norms are often assumed to be entering a state of re-alignment. This is most apparent in the field of foreign policy. There may be little difference between the republican aligned hawks and neoconservatives in the mold of George W Bush and Tom Cotton when put up besides the Samantha Powers and Michelle Flournoys of the ‘muscular liberalism’ and humanitarian interventionist crowd. There is, however, a growing disconnect between such people in both parties and the vast majority of everyone else in the American body politic. Especially in the wake of Trump’s failure to govern in ways contrary to the foreign policy positions he ran against in his primary and the Democrat’s continuous turn to shore up a Beltway Blob dominated array of bipartisan advisors. ‘Horseshoe Theory’ may be the rejected detritus of political science undergrad in love with their own rote-indoctrinated received wisdom, but the clear fear of this largely nonexistent entity by the national security state mandarins implies that were someone to even partially invoke it, it might catch the establishment off balance and make real gains before it inevitably collapses. Nixon goes to China, but for domestic lobbying. To see the effectiveness of that event all you have to do is dig into the history of Moscow’s flailing reactions to it. Seizing the initiative to do something unexpected is often a strategic principle that pays out more than the initial investment.
Sensing the tides shifting against them, a coordinated effort has been made to merge the consensus of endless imperium into one cohesive bloc that can seize as many levers of power while the window of opportunity is still open. If this process is completed it will lock in another decade of endless war and regime change into the American foreign policy establishment as well as hasten our domestic decline by diverting money and effort into the Beltway’s perpetual growth industry of exporting conflict abroad. It is justified by invoking existential bugbears, training the body politic to believe that every great power rivalry is a battle for the soul of the world. But the fact is while the 1930s and 40s might be the model for our propaganda, but they were a freakish outlier. Almost all such rivalries are regional, non-ideological, and bear little consequence for the average citizen unless they turn hot. Even the Cold War, outside of those countries unfortunate enough to be caught in the proxy conflicts, cannot be viewed as an ideological struggle that it was sold was as by both sides but rather simply the largest scale bipolar power rivalry yet to occur in history. Change the governing systems of either the United States or the Soviet Union, and the most important detail still leads to a similar rivalry: two massive power poles with no other truly threatening competitors outside of each other. Already, the process is underway to begin again but this time with the Chinese. The Chinese, however, are (so far) smart enough not to couch their precautions as anything but safeguarding their national interests and autonomy of action. A ‘New Cold War’ could remain relatively lukewarm if the United States followed suit. Instead, and knowing the heyday of its focus on the Middle East may be closing, the U.S. seems to again be gearing up its Christian-dominionist-inherited (and now thoroughly liberal and bipartisan establishment) cultural complex to advocate for values-based conflict along Manichean ends. It begins again, this time against a foe likely not foolish enough to fall into the trap of competing with Washington for the ‘soul of the world.’
For American strategists with a sense of deep history (sadly, a rarity) it is obvious that the country risks over-expansion and that over-expansion risks the entire enterprise coming apart due to lack of strength in the core. The costs balloon, the deployments expand, but each commitment is less solid than the last. Presence everywhere is weakness across the globe, not strength in a specific region. The more money that gets diverted away from internal science and technology, infrastructure, logistics, and adapting to climate change, the more this world empire rots into something like 18th Century Spain or 17th century Ming China…an outwardly impressive edifice just waiting for someone to kick in the door that then takes with it the walls and roof attached to it when it falls. The right does not want this because American power will end in humiliation. The left should not want it because humiliation breeds reaction, retrenchment, and xenophobia. And this is to say nothing of the immense human costs abroad. People in neither camp should want the sudden power vacuum that will set off a succession of sequel conflicts. I do not want it for all of these reasons combined. On this issue they share a common enemy more than happy to divide them with cultural issues. It is time to see past this division and forge the necessary links to lobby for a negotiated and sustainable reduction in U.S. global commitments so that over-expansion can be halted and the danger of a major world spanning conflict or sudden power vacuum occur.
There is clearly a market for featuring anti-establishment commentary from left, right, and elsewhere which is united in its opposition to the post-Cold War consensus. Already, the Quincy Institute has made waves in discussion outsized to its newborn and comparatively small status. But to be a truly impactful force there must be a left-right anti-establishment alliance on foreign policy issues that grows to the level of significant and fearsome lobby up on Capitol Hill. The kind of coalition that can give the defense contractors and the well-paid friends of Saudi Arabia and Israel a true run for their money at shaping the discourse of war and peace. This is only the first step of course, but here we are not even having taken them yet.
In order for this to work certain agreements have to be made to overcome the differences in left- and right-wing approaches to conceptualizing foreign policy. The first thing to understand is that most meaningful differences between the two wings are on domestic policy. Domestic policy, however, operates under a much different framework than foreign policy does. ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ itself is a terminology that comes from the seating arrangements of the French revolutionary government and implies an internally deliberative body. Today it barely even makes much sense as a political label on anything that is not economics or determining who is a citizen. Even if one does find the label useful, it is an appeal to a greater authority of a single community for how a state should be structured. In international relations, however, anarchy reigns above the level of sovereign states. There is no powerful entity capable of restraining the ambitions and foibles or large states. Bilateral relations and exclusionary alliances reign supreme. Universalism in intent or purpose does not exist in the inter-state system.
Whatever cultural or budgetary disagreements held by left and right can therefore be separated from foreign policy convergence against militarism, endless war, and a truly disproportionate defense budget. I know many more inclined to be on the left (including myself, if unconventionally) who think the coverage of foreign policy issues in The American Conservative is among the best around today. I know many on the right who look at issues-based alliances between Rand Paul with Tulsi Gabbard and ‘Ro Khanna on foreign affairs with a point of pride. These are pretty mainstream examples, but there is where the discussion should start in terms of accessibility. The point is to win over as much of the public as possible when you want to change policy, even if before that point all unpopular or unrepresented causes must inevitably and probably preferably begin in some level of esotericism.
In order to overcome any reticence on either side, a few points of divergence have to be overcome first when discussing foreign policy. To do this the left must concede to the idea of state sovereignty as an absolute bulwark of international affairs, and the right must concede that American Exceptionalism is nothing but a vehicle of jingoistic chauvinism. While not all actors in either camp are beholden to these ideologies, both are quite common and present the largest stumbling block towards coming together.
The importance of sovereignty as an upholder of stable diplomatic relations means both liberals and leftists must de-emphasize universal internationalism as an ideology guiding their world view. This would also be wise because most international institutions in the present era are heavily infiltrated by people who support American actions at spreading invasive and messianic economic and political interventionism to developing countries. There is no point in an internationalism that must play second fiddle to the currently declining neoliberal project in the first place. With this also comes dropping any kind of narrative of universal human progress. International relations are an exercise in crisis management and not social engineering. Besides, as I wrote recently for The Hill, there are many strategic and stabilizing benefits for the general public to adopting such a doctrine.
On the other side, the right must give up the siren song of exceptionalism and the Reagan derived ‘shining city on a hill’ vision of the United States as a uniquely virtuous actor. Nationalism cannot blind advocates of restraint from the cold realities of geopolitics, where self-interested actors exploit circumstantial advantages in a setting where no greater authority regulates state behavior. Either no countries are uniquely virtuous or all of them are virtuous in different ways-which is effectively the same thing. There are no such things as exceptionalism in international politics save more effective and less effective strategies. If individuals should not be special snowflakes, neither should states. We can even call this new stance ‘The Hadrian Doctrine’ to appeal to that common conservative love of the classics.
If these points can be agreed upon by both wings- even in a broad way-then the overall project of building a large movement ready to take on the endless war lobby can go ahead. Military force as a last rather than first option, diplomacy that benefits the citizen rather a few centrist ideologues and defense contractors, and a general commitment to avoiding further expansion of an already unsustainably large overseas empire. This needs to be something actively worked on to be grown into a ‘Restraint Lobby’ that wields coordinated power in DC. Such an attempt must be made before the consolidation of the center around a bipartisan neoconservatism (or the attempts of a desperate and incompetent president) returns to plunge us into another era of imperial calamity.
Perhaps a first small-scale test case is needed where I specific policy can be targeted. Knowing how many on both the left and right feel about Syria, I would recommend starting to make the case there. And in my own way, I already have. I hope others join me and we can grow this into something bigger and more coordinated.
5 thoughts on “The Present Necessity of a Left-Right Foreign Policy Alliance”
I truly do respect your efforts here. You truly have a well thought out deal here. Alas stopping American Imperialism even to save itself is impossible now. I hate to sound like a negative Nancy but the distortion of american consciousness is ENDLESSLY deep. Old or young, rich or poor, THIS is the limit of these people. The time of their ruin is nigh.
Alternatively perhaps I am wrong. Perhaps the fight is indeed worth it in the end. As Machiavelli says
“Victories are never so decisive that the winner can override every principle, justice in particular. But if your ally loses, you’re still his friend and he’ll offer what help he can: you can become companions in misfortune, and your luck could always turn.”
Me I’m just busy trying to prep for the eviction crisis coming the beginning of next year most like. Perhaps you can use that to your advantage?
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I’m a big fan of preparing for the worst and working for the (realistic) best at the same time. It doesnt have to be one or the other. You are absolutely correct that there is a limit to these people, but that just makes forging the right strategic links between people who don’t fit in with dominant trends all the more important. And if their end does come its better to have a more coordinated successor regime than a less coordinated one. Alliance networks tend not to end up in reality how we picture them in hypothetical theory.
Things getting worse often means things will just get worse, but they are also opportunity. Almost always. People are less likely to change when there is no crisis. And I can think of few opportunities better for this than both major political parties having harnessed themselves to out of touch boomers, two senile old man figureheads, and have remarkably few hard policy differences between them when we as a planet face a succession of generation-defining crisis. We might fail sure but well really curse ourselves if we do nothing even so.
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Indeed! My coalition politics sure are complex
I agree with your basic premise that policy matters more than ideology in international relations, but I fear that America’s domestic political system makes a strategic retreat unlikely. Not only is this country overreaching across the globe, but it has built up for years an ideology of military worship that both Democrats and Republicans have to at least play lip service to.
Not only that, but actual bases and troops aside, America is spending billions in military aid to various countries like Saudi Arabia, and I wonder if it is realistic to expect that to stop when it’s so lucrative for the defense industry.
Not to mention power and wealth of the domestically based defense industry in general. I agree with the normative aspect of your argument, but I wonder if this shift in foreign policy is likely, and if it is, what will be the global repercussions of such a retreat.
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The question is intrinsically tied up with that of market fundamentalism. Something else the right and left generally oppose (though the left far more convincingly). Talk to any rightists under 40 and you will find great disdain for neoliberalism, capitalism being the central aspect of life, etc. They believe in mistaken fixes to those problems but they do recognize the problem, something the center does not because that is their ideology which they either genuinely believe in or are paid to believe in. For profit private contractors are in fact one of the key opponents to any meaningful foreign policy reform and being able to talk across ideological barriers about it is a great starting point. The anti-consoooomer memes seems to have started to the right and that plus mocking the Bugmen/Harry Potter/West Wing libs on both left and right seems to me to show an appetite for this kind of thing.
You are right that meaningful change happening before a major war either embarrasses or exhausts the US is unlikely, but unlikely is not impossible. There is clearly a growing distaste with these policies among the general public which is not represented by our media at all, as contemporary polling trends show time and time again. Much like how socially liberal/fiscally conservative types dominate the media classes but are probably the single smallest socially acceptable ideological faction in the general populace, the media narrative around militarism is not reflective of the actual reality and is far closer to a social network of manufacturing consent rather than reflecting it.
Plus, if the only win we get is to say ‘I told you so’, that is still a win for us in the long run. Another concrete example to hold over the foes of which faction saw what was coming and presented ideas on how to avoid it. And so what wasnt useful the first time grows in utility for the next time. The opposition to the Iraq War was deeply unpopular at first, and clearly failed, but in the end their judgement was proven and they got more credit. (Not in the legacy media of course where the inverse was true, but in terms of actual politicians).
The repercussions of US retreat will be a variety of smaller hegemonies localized in regions, with small countries directly bordering the big powers losing out but most other small countries benefiting from being able to have potential patrons compete/uphold their autonomy.
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